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Nontechnical summary
This paper considers training, mobility and wages together in order to test whether rm provided training contains a specic component. From a human capital perspective, company training increases the productivity of a match, while from an informational perspective, it improves the knowledge about the quality of a particular job match.
From both points of view, training is expected to inuence wages, mobility, and wage eects of mobility. Wages contain information about the productivity change or the updated knowledge through training, and so does mobility. We use these interrelations in order to test empirically whether training exhibits mainly general or specic human capital in two particular ways.
First, mobility eects of training can serve as a test whether training contains a rmspecic content but are also interesting in themselves. One reason is that mobility can disturb the investment decision of a rm that decides about providing training.
Also, mobility can be eciency enhancing if bad job matches are dissolved which were detected due to training. Mobility is expected to increase or to remain unchanged if training contains mostly general human capital, while we expect a decreasing mobility when training is mostly specic and not portable between employers. Hence, we use regressions explaining mobility with training participation as explanatory variable as a rst test whether training generates general or specic human capital.
As a second empirical test, we consider wage eects of mobility after training. In the light of rent sharing between employers and employees, we expect a positive or zero wage eect of a job change after general training, while specic capital should decrease wages after a job change because a new employer will not reward the specic capital that was useful in the old job. So, wage eects of mobility can be seen to discriminate between those two forms of human capital. To evaluate the wage eects of mobility, we use reported wages directly, but, in addition, we use the judgement of employees whether they proted from their last job change or not, a unique feature of the dataset.
We try to identify a causal eect of training on mobility and on the wage eect of a job change to discriminate between specic and general human capital. As proposed by modern search theory, we take into account that mobility can be endogenous in the wage regression. We also consider endogeneity of the training decision with respect to the mobility decision, since there might be selection into training or mobility.
Summarising, we nd empirical evidence in favour of training inhibiting job, rm or occupation specic capital. We nd that the probability of being mobile is negatively correlated with the probability of participating in training. Further, we nd that both the partial correlation and the wage eects of (exogenous) mobility are negative for the group of training participants, while there is no eect for the group of non-training participants. Furthermore, using a subjective measure whether individuals proted from their last job change or not, we nd that participation in training negatively aects the propensity to be better o after a job change.
Training, mobility, and wages: specic versus general human capital Alfred Garlo (ZEW) and Anja Kuckulenz (ZEW) 1 Introduction
Employees can pursue various strategies over their professional life to increase their wage. They can invest in (general or specic) human capital to increase productivity and to be paid accordingly or they can search for better paid jobs (compare Antel (1986) ). Training and mobility decisions are not separable, they inuence each other and should be analysed simultaneously. Individuals may choose to stay with an employer after (specic) training or they may choose to change the employer after (general) training in order to reap the benet from training if the old employer keeps part of the training rent.
Firms invest in training activities in order to raise the level of qualication of their work force and to secure strong economic performance. In Germany, about 40% of the employees obtain training during one year (see Berichtssystem Weiterbildung for data for the year 2000 1 ). Four years before, in the years 1995/96 the participation in training seems to have been a bit lower with about 7.1 millions members of the German workforce participating in training (see Franz (2003) ). Employees aged between 35
and 50 have the highest training participation shares. In 2001, rms in Germany invested almost 17 billion euro in training their workforce (see Weiÿ (2003) ). Hence, rm provided training is considered one of the major post school investments in human capital. Human capital plays an important role in the process of economic growth and individuals' labour market outcomes are linked to their educational attainment. Wage eects of training have been examined and discussed extensively in the literature (see e.g. Pischke (2001) , Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) , Buechel and Pannenberg (2004) , Juerges and Schneider (2005) , and Kuckulenz and Maier (2006) for Germany or Pfeier 2 This paper considers training, mobility and wages together in order to test whether rm provided training inhibits a specic component. From a human capital perspective, company training increases the productivity of a match, while from an informational perspective, it improves the knowledge about the quality of a particular job match. From both points of view, training is expected to have positive eects on wages, and zero or negative eects on mobility, and on wage eects of mobility. Wages contain information about the productivity change or the updated knowledge through training, and so does mobility. We use these interrelations in order to test empirically whether training exhibits mainly general or specic human capital in two particular ways. More specically, we interpret mobility eects and wage eects of mobility in terms of the specicity of the skills that have been acquired in training 1 Berichtssystem Weiterbildung VIII, Integrierter Gesamtbericht zur Weiterbildungssituation in Deutschland, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF), Bonn 2 Early work that is concerned with specic training and turnover is e.g. Oi (1962) and Deere (1987) . Newer work that deals with mobility and training, mostly in the context of frictional labour markets, is e.g. Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (2003) , Owan (2004) , and Adnett, Bougheas, and Georgellis (2004). courses.
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The specicity of the contents of training courses is interesting for several reasons. If rm-provided training is general there might exist a hold-up problem, a case of underinvestment. Consider the case, where an employer pays for the (general) training of an employee under the premise that the individual is paid below marginal productivity afterwards. Clearly, the individual has an incentive to renegotiate the wage after the investment, since the investment costs are sunk. If rms anticipate the renegotiation, they will underinvest in training and there is scope for government intervention.
Second, the specicity of training investments has been discussed in the context of international dierences in labour mobility and unemployment developments (see, e.g., Wasmer (2003) ). In this view, the specicity of human capital is central for the adaptability of a system to a changing environment. If, for example, skill-biased technical change accelerates the turbulence in an economy and therefore turnover increases, general skills become more important, since they can be used in many rms. On the other hand, in an economy with a low degree of turnover, a high degree of specicity of skills might guarantee a high labour productivity. Finally, the degree of specicity of company-provided training has also been discussed theoretically and empirically by Krueger and Pischke (1998) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) with a focus on the investment in training. They nd that under certain conditions, rms are willing to invest in general training and show with German survey data that indeed, part of rmprovided training in Germany is general (see also Booth and Zoega (2001) who provide conditions under which rms provide general training).
The paper is set up as follows. First, we derive two hypotheses in order to empirically test whether training provides participants also with specic skills. Second, we introduce and describe our data set. Third, we line out our estimation strategy. Fourth, we describe our empirical results which are split in three parts. First, we test whether training participation is correlated with mobility and the propensity of switching jobs.
Second, controlling for the endogeneity of job mobility we look at the wage eects of job changes for individuals that have participated in training and for individuals that have not. Third, we use the individuals judgement whether their last job change was benecial to assess the training eect on the wage eect of mobility. Finally, we sum up, conclude and give an outlook.
Derivation of Hypotheses and Estimation Strategy
To our knowledge there are no theoretical models in the training literature which explicitly show the relationship between training participation, mobility, and wage 3 As argued above, training in specic skills is often observationally equivalent to training that generates information about the quality of a particular match and that is lost upon termination of the match. For an empirical attempt to distinguish between these two kinds of specic capital, see Nagypál (2004) .
eects (of mobility). Nevertheless, like previous papers (e.g. Antel (1986) or Spletzer and Loewenstein (1998) ), using insights from human capital theory and search theory, we argue that these are interrelated. The coherences between training, mobility, and wages can be used as tests whether training exhibits rm specic human capital.
Mobility Eect of Training
The decision to invest in training on the side of the rm and on the side of the individual is inuenced by (expected) mobility. On the one hand, rms are expected to invest in general training of the workforce only if they are able to appropriate part of the returns to the productivity increase. This implies that rms are only then likely to invest in general training if they can restrict workers' mobility afterwards, or if rms expect the mobility of workers to be small.
4 One reason for a low labour mobility can be found in the existence of labour market frictions. For example, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Holzner (2005) show that in the case of the existence of frictions and wage bargaining, it can be optimal for rms to invest in general training.
5 On the other hand, mobility might be the desired result (see, e.g., Harris and Felli (2004) ). Training might serve screening purposes and might be performed in order to distinguish good from bad matches and sort out the bad ones (e.g., trainee programs might be partly performed for this reason). In this case, mobility would be high after training, because bad matches are wedded out.
If training generates a rent due to higher worker productivity, it depends on how this rent is shared, whether the employer wants to keep the trained worker, or whether the employee has an incentive to stay with the rm. From the employer's point of view this means that as long as there is a rent generated by training, a rm prefers to lay o workers that have not obtained training to those workers which have participated in training. If a worker gains from participation in training and cannot be sure to obtain the same wage mark up from another employer (e.g. due to asymmetric information or specicity of training), the probability for a trained worker to quit and search for a new job will be lower than for a non-trained worker. This implies that the eect of training on the probability of moving between jobs reveals information about the nature of training and rent-sharing.
For training that generates specic human capital, even in a competitive market, there is no unique solution of how to assign the existing rent between employer and employee.
The employer might want to pay the individual a wage above the outside option in 4 One reason for this might be that there are complementarities between general and specic human capital (see e.g. Casas-Arce (2005)). In this case, the investment in general capital on the side of the rms induces individuals to invest (more) in specic capital, and thus the mobility of the individuals is reduced.
5 The investment decision in training in the case of frictions has also been examined by Quercioli (2005) , who discusses the decision to invest in specic capital in the context of an equilibrium search model.
order to prevent the individual from changing the employer. It is a reasonable strategy for an employer to provide specic training to workers and to nance this via a low employee turnover through wages below marginal productivity and above the outside option. Another argument for wages above the outside option is that there is a holdup problem, if an individual is able to extract ex-post a part of the (quasi-)rent by renegotiating after training costs are sunk. So, negative mobility eects of training are to be expected in case training imparts specic skills, and in the realistic case where individuals capture a non-zero part of the return to investment in training.
If training provides individuals with general skills, this should not alter the mobility decision in a competitive market. This is because skills are fully paid for in such a world. If, however, the market is not competitive, the eect on mobility is less clear.
Mobility may be aected by investments in general skills since market imperfections can turn technologically general into de facto specic skills (see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) ). This is the case, when mobility is constrained or, when the outside wage oer (distribution) does not increase one to one with (the productivity eect of ) general skills. It is conceivable that the employing rm does not fully recognise the general skills from training because if the rm has paid for (part of ) the training it wants to prot from it and keep (part of ) the rent. Then, there could be a mobility increasing eect of general training if other rms are willing to pay for the increased productivity.
Hence, for training generating general human capital we expect zero or positive eects on mobility. In the empirical application, we will interpret a zero eect of training on mobility as training that contains only general human capital, although theoretically it is possible that rms pay individuals their outside option in the case of specic training.
The following proposition summarizes the above arguments.
Proposition 1 If training contains only general human capital, then the mobility decision of workers is unaected if workers are paid their outside option (the competitive case) or the mobility decision is positively aected when workers are paid below their outside option (the rent sharing case). If training contains a specic component, the mobility eect is expected to be negative since in general individuals are paid above their outside option.
Estimation Strategy
We assume that the error term in the decision of being mobile is normally distributed and therefore model the mobility decision as a Probit model. According to this model, the probability of changing the employer depends on a vector X, which in our case contains individual characteristics, job characteristics, rm characteristics and a constant, 6
6 Notice that both rm and job characteristics refer to the current job, i.e. the job an individual changes to. We are aware that this is a critical assumption, but unfortunately, we do not have data on the previous job. Therefore, we only include these characteristics as controls rather than giving an interpretation as (causal) eects on mobility. For the standard interpretation as coecient we would on a parameter vector β and on the unobservable error term .
(1) JC * = P (JC = 1|X, T ) + = Φ(β X + γT ) + JC = 1 means an job change, T is training participation, γ is the eect of training on the probability to change the job, JC * can take the values zero and one.
The model is estimated by maximising the likelihood function as it is standard with binary choice models, where the likelihood function is the product of the cumulated density function (of the normal distribution) for job changers and of the survivor for job stayers.
Note however, that training might be endogenous with respect to mobility, for example in the case of specialisation in search or in training as suggested in Antel (1986) . In order to generate exogenous variation of the probability of training participation, we use the training intensity by industry, estimated from an earlier wave of the dataset in use. 
is the (linear probability) model to be estimated by 2SLS, where X contains a constant, T is training participation as before and u is an error term. Again, JC * takes the values zero or one. The instrument is the predicted probability for participating in traininĝ
When estimating the model as 2SLS, we use a robust estimator for the variancecovariance matrix, since standard errors are heteroscedastic by construction, when estimating a binary response model as linear regression model.
Wage Eect of Mobility
Closely linked to the question of mobility of individuals after training participation are wage eects of mobility if individuals have participated in training before. This is interesting because the wage eect of a job change to a new rm reveals information about the skills of an individual which are transferable across rms. Discussing the wage eect of mobility after training, human capital theory predicts wage losses if training has provided the individual with specic skills. In the case of general training, under rent sharing, individuals might be paid below their outside option. In this case, there could be wage gains from a job change. For this to be true, it does not matter whether mobility is endogenous or exogenous.
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Following Loewenstein and Spletzer (2000), we interpret the empirical eect of training on wages as an indicator for the degree of specicity of the training obtained. We test whether workers who change their job after training are paid less than those workers which do not change their job after training. A high wage of job movers after training may indicate that employers share costs of and returns to general training and that full gains from training investments can be reaped by employees at a new employer.
A low wage of job movers, in contrast, might indicate that rm (job) specic skills are lost and productivity in the new rm is lower (see also Loewenstein (1998), Pannenberg (1995) , Booth and Bryan (2002) and Gern (2004) . Hence, if training provides individuals with specic skills and if returns are shared, a job change after training is predicted to have a negative eect on wages. There is no theoretical prediction for a job change without training. If a job change also invokes a negative coecient, then the eect of a job change after training is bigger in absolute value. In case of general skills and the presence of rent sharing between employer and employee,
11 From this point of view, individuals receive their outside option if they change jobs, independently of whether jobtojob transitions are exogenous or endogenous.
the predicted coecient of a job change after training is positive or zero, because it is not certain whether the part of the rent which is captured by the rm providing training is also obtained by a new employer. Therefore, estimating the coecient of job change in a wage regression after participating in training gives a hint whether training is mainly rm specic or general.
The following proposition summarizes the arguments.
Proposition 2 If training provides individuals with general skills, a job change after training implies no wage change (in the case of a competitive market) or a positive wage change if the rm captures a part of the rent generated by training (the rent sharing case). If training also contains specic human capital, we expect the wage change caused by job mobility to be negative since, in general, the worker will be able to extract a part of the rent generated by specic training.
Estimation Strategy
We estimate a Mincer equation and interpret the coecient of job change after training. In the regression we control for a variety of demographic variables, including the variables of an enhanced Mincer equation, experience and tenure and the square of both. We treat mobility eects for the group of training participants and individuals that have not participated in training separately, because training participants and non-training participants might be systematically dierent.
More formally, for training participants we have
lnY are log earnings, X contains schooling, experience (squared), tenure (squared) and lots of demographic variables, but also rm, job and industry characteristics and a constant and β 1 is the coecient vector. β 2 is the inuence of a job change after training (J CT ) on earnings and e represents an unobservable error term. For non-participants we estimate a similar equation.
There are some remarks to make, however. The above analysis assumes that in order to consistently estimate the wage eect of jobtojob transitions after training, job movers and stayers are similar otherwise. This is not sucient, however, because the decision to change a job depends on various factors such as previous training. Mobility is endogenous if the mobility decision is taken because of the outside wage, while mobility is exogenous when mobility takes place for reasons that do not depend on the outside wage. It is not problematic to use exogenous mobility in a wage regression, while the use of endogenous mobility leads to a bias.
Notice that if individuals are paid their outside option, mobility cannot be endogenous.
If individuals are not paid their outside option and if the decision to change a job is taken as assumed in search theory, there is an endogeneity problem. To see this, recognise that from this point of view, the decision to change a job is made on the basis of the current wage and outside wage oers that arrive at irregular time intervals and that are random draws from a wage oer distribution. Hence, wage and job mobility are determined simultaneously.
Still, involuntary job mobility is not enough to guarantee exogeneity of the job change variable with respect to the wage, since rms might lay o people because of wages being too high. Using information whether the partner is working and whether there are children in schooling age helps us to identify the wage eect of exogenous and involuntary mobility.
12 We base our analysis of wage eects of job moves both upon a comparison of stayers and movers accounting for endogeneity (i.e. a 2SLS approach) and upon the direct appraisal of the individuals whether the job change ameliorated their professional position or not.
13 For all estimated models we choose a robust variancecovariance estimator, since wages are in general assumed to be heteroscedastic.
14 An alternative approach to evaluate the job change eect for training participants and non-training participants is to use the direct subjective judgement of individuals whether they proted from their last job change or not and to explain this dummy variable by participation in training. Clearly, we restrict our attention to job changers in this case. Note that there is no reason to suppose an endogeneity problem in this case, since we restrict our attention to job changers. There would be a problem of endogeneity if the training participation decision depended on the perceived returns to future mobility.
Data and Descriptive Evidence
We use a rich data set, compiled from a representative sample of 0. 13 For the same reason why a job change is endogenous in a wage regression, tenure is also endogenous. By including information on the number of previous employers, however, we can account for a source of endogeneity in tenure.
14 Note that the selection in training is clearly endogenous with respect to the wage. Therefore, analogous to Wolf and Zwick (2002) (2001)).
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• The rst key variable is participation in training during the last ve years. The rst question is whether the individual participated in courses or seminars in this time period. The second inquiry is on the year the last training course took place.
17 By combining both questions, we obtain dummies for participation in training in either one specic year or in several years. Since we know when training took place, we can use this information later to distinguish between training before or after job changes. An important measurement problem of our training variables is that they do not include information on the length and costs of the training attended. Hence, we cannot control for training intensity when estimating eects on wage and mobility.
• The second key variable is job change. We cannot directly observe this variable.
To construct the job change variable and the date of job change, we use information on the number of employers together with the question since when one works for the actual employer. It is also asked why people have changed the employer and whether they proted from the job change. We use the judgement 15 To discuss interrelations between training, mobility and wages, it would be optimal to use a large panel data set where individuals are observed before and after training and job changes. For Germany, the Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is the only available panel data set including this information. It also provides direct information on whether training is general or rm specic. For our purpose, the GSOEP contains too little observations, however. For example, only 4 individuals in the data set took part in on-the-job training in 1998 and changed their job afterwards (own calculations from GSOEP 2000). This means that thorough empirical testing of our hypotheses is impossible.
The rst category includes all earnings below 600 DM, the second includes earnings from 600 DM until 1,000 DM. The following categories comprise earnings intervals of 500 DM up to 6,000 DM.
From 6,000 DM to earnings of 10,000 DM, the intervals are in steps of 1,000 DM. The next category comprises earnings from 10,000 DM until 15,000 DM and the last category includes all earnings of 15,000 DM, and above. Most earnings can be found in the categories between 3,000 DM and 5,000
DM, see table 6 in the appendix for descriptive statistics. 
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• As discussed above, a job change is partly endogenous in the wage regression.
In principal, there is some nice information on exogenous job change in the data set, which we can use as instruments, namely rm closure, and occupational changes for health or family reason.
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In the wage regression, unfortunately, these instruments do not generate enough variation or are surprisingly not exogenous.
Hence, we use two further variables as instruments which cause variation in the job change equation but not in the wage equation. First, we use information on the fact whether the employed individual has a partner that is employed, too. It is reasonable to assume (and is empirically shown) that this variable is not related to an individuals earnings, while it is very realistic to think that the individual is more bound to a region, so that there are less job oers and therefore less employer changes. As a second variable, we use a dummy whether the individual has children between 6 and 17 years. To see why, in the wage equation we control for the number of children, since this is (signicantly) correlated with the wage.
But, we think (and show) that whether the children are in schooling age or not does aect mobility while it should (and empirically does) not aect earnings.
• Further explanatory variables are those found in the Mincer-equation, i.e. work experience (and its square), 21 job tenure (and its square), former unemployment, and dummies for the highest educational achievement.
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• Along with these standard variables, we also include some dummies capturing the professional status, such as blue-collar or white-collar worker, civil servant or 18 Note that the job change variable not only includes direct jobtojob transitions. It also includes for example individuals that transit through unemployment, before working for the next employer.
For comparison reasons, we have constructed a job change variable for individuals that are never unemployed before the interview. The results do not dier by much, though.
19 The CVTS data is from 1999 and therefore ts well to the BIBB/IAB data set. 20 In a former version of the paper we have estimated training participation equations using job changes as an explanatory variable and using the above instruments. In this estimation these instruments worked quite nicely.
21 We know when the individual started his or her rst job and we include dummies for discontinuation such as unemployment.
22 In Germany, the highest schooling degree is more informative for the level of education than years of schooling (see Georgellis and Lange (1997) ). dierent sophistication levels of tasks.
• In addition, we use the following job characteristics: computer use, prot-sharing, bonus payments, overtime work, whether a job is temporary, and main job contents. These variables allow us to control a large part of the individual heterogeneity between the employees.
23 Some of these variables (for example, overtime work) can be interpreted as indicators for intrinsic motivation.
• Additional control variables explaining earnings are personal attributes. We include dummies for females, having children, and German nationality.
• Finally, we also control for the rm size and we include a dummy indicating whether the individual lives in East or West Germany because earnings as well as costs of living still dier between the two regions. 26 If an individual has more than two previous employers, this increases the probability of a job change and points to the fact that the number of previous job changes is an important predictor for future job changes. This is in accordance with specialisation in search or specic training as proposed by Antel (1986) or with the hobo syndrome by Ghiselli (1974) , where employees have an intrinsic motivation to change jobs after some years.
Interpreting and comparing the point estimates of the two approaches, means that exogenous training participation has, on average, a bigger negative partial correlation with labour mobility than training participation in the population. That is, if somebody is admitted exogenously to training, he or she is more likely to stay in the rm. This is counterintuitive and contradicts the Antel (1986) story where people are assumed to specialise in training or search.
Because of this counterintuitive result, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of training given the instruments. We fail to reject exogeneity for the instruments in use. From this we conclude that we should not overinterpret the IV results and we prefer the Probit results. Summarising, the results point to a negative eect of training on mobility. This is consistent with training inhibiting specic capital for the employer or the match which would be lost upon job change.
26 To see that there might be an endogeneity problem, recognise that an individual who wants to change the employer has no incentive to invest in employer specic human capital. The number of observations slightly diers between the two approaches, since there are some dierences in the industry classication between the two waves. The rst stage results are printed in the appendix (see As a second empirical test, we consider wage eects of mobility after training. In the light of rent sharing between employers and employees, we expect a positive or zero wage eect of a job change after general training, while specic capital should decrease wages after a job change because a new employer will not reward the specic capital that was useful in the old job. As expected after the rst test result, we nd here that both estimates, the partial correlation as well as the wage eect of an employer change, for the subgroup of training participants are negative (see tables 3 to 4). Both least squares and IV-methods yield a signicant negative coecient and the eect increases in magnitude when endogeneity of the employer change is taken into account.
27 An exogenous job change is associated with a higher wage loss than an endogenous job change, where individuals decide voluntarily to change the job on the basis of a wage comparison, as we would expect. Clearly, in the individuals' decision to change a job the wage that an alternative job would pay, plays a crucial role. This is conrmed by our results. The fact that both endogenous and exogenous employer changes yield a wage loss for the group of training participants was predicted from the hypothesis that training incorporates a substantial share of employer or job specic capital. This conrms the results from the previous section. Recognise however, that the dierence between the IV estimator and the OLS estimator implies that there is endogenous mobility, pointing to the fact that a simple human capital interpretation is not admissible.
Since search theory predicts a negative eect of job changes also in the absence of specic capital, 28 we also consider the population of non-training participants and wage eects of job changes in this group (see tables 10 to 12 in the appendix). The correlation between the job change variable and the wage is not signicantly dierent from zero.
Taking endogeneity of employer changes into account and using a dummy variable for whether the partner is employed and for the age of children as instruments, again yields an insignicant coecient for job change. Summarising, (exogenous) job changes seem to have no signicant eect on wages for the group of non-training participants (this conrms the results in Pannenberg (1995) . This nding is consistent with individuals being paid their outside option on average.
Finally, we use information, where individuals judge themselves whether they proted from their last job change (see table 5 ). A Probit model for the group of job changers with training (before the job change) as explanatory variable yields a negative coefcient, which is signicant. Note that a specialisation in training or search does not predict endogeneity of training in this equation, because it predicts a correlation between job change and training but not a correlation between the wage change through 27 Again, the number of observations diers because of some missing values for the instruments. The rst stage estimation can be found in the appendix (see table 9 ). 29 We conclude that training participation seems to have a negative eect on the propensity to improve upon the perceived position through a jobtojob change. In our view, this is the most convincing test because it is the most direct evidence on the specity of training substance. It supports our result that training inhibits specic human capital, which is lost when switching to a dierent job.
Conclusion
In this paper we analysed the eects of training on mobility and the eect of training on the wage eects of mobility. We used these results to interpret the degree of specicity 29 In addition, we found in the mobility estimation that the null hypothesis of exogeneity could not be rejected, so that this sort of endogeneity is probably not present. of training. All in all, the results suggest that there are both a negative correlation of training with job change and a negative eect of training on job change. As far as the wage is concerned, there are stable causal negative eects of both employer and occupational changes on wages for the group of training participants. For the group of non-training participants there is no signicant relationship between a job change and wages, thereby suggesting that individuals are on average paid their outside option. This suggests that training indeed has a specic component which is lost for exogenous and endogenous, for voluntary and involuntary job changes. Note, that this is also consistent with the idea that training generates information on the quality of a particular match.
Using the direct judgement from job changers whether they proted from job change or not, seems to bear the best information however, since it is easier to nd the adequate control group. We can easily take the group of individuals that has proted from a job change and compare training participants and non-participants. Here, we nd that training reduces the probability of an amelioration through a job change. Thus, from this view, too, training can be interpreted as incorporating employer (job) specic human capital.
Summing up, the evidence points to the fact that most training seems to generate some specic capital. This specic capital can be existent as a real productivity increase in the respective rm or, equivalently, as information about the quality of the match. Our ndings are somewhat in contradiction to recent ndings that most training is general, but it may well be the case that training provides both, rm specic and general human capital. Future work should try to capture better the heterogeneity of training and distinguish between various kinds of training when testing for specicity.
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